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PROVING RETALIATION AFTER BURLINGTON v. WHITE 
INTRODUCTION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 seeks to eradicate employment 
discrimination by making two categories of employer conduct unlawful: 
discrimination based on an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin, and discrimination based on an individual’s efforts to enforce the Act’s 
basic guarantees.1  Because enforcement of the Act depends on employees 
reporting illegal practices, the protection of discrimination claimants is 
crucial.2  Until recently, however, the level of protection varied across the 
nation, as the circuits were split over what types of retaliatory conduct violated 
Title VII.  Some circuits applied the same standard to retaliation claims as to 
underlying discrimination claims;3 some circuits limited actionable retaliatory 
conduct to “ultimate employment decision[s];”4 and some held that employer 
conduct was actionable if it would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from 
making a discrimination claim.5  The need for a uniform standard increased, 
and retaliation claims became more frequent after enactment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, which allowed plaintiffs suing under Title VII to seek 
compensatory and punitive damages.6  Of the 75,428 discrimination charges 
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 2005, 
25.8% were Title VII retaliation charges,7 up from 14.5% in 1992.8 
 
 1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 3(a) (2000); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White 
(Burlington), ____ U.S. ____ , 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412 (2006). 
 2. See Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2414 (“[The] purpose of the anti-retaliation provision is to 
ensure that employees are ‘completely free from coercion against reporting unlawful practices.”) 
(citing NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121–22 (1972)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 3. E.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 4. E.g., Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 5. E.g., Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1991); PATRICIA A. WISE, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING 
WORKPLACE RETALIATION 1, 4 (2000) (attributing the increase in retaliation claims to the fact 
that they “generally are easier to prove and result in larger damage awards than other 
discrimination claims”). 
 7. EEOC, CHARGE STATISTICS: FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2006, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html. 
 8. EEOC, CHARGE STATISTICS: FY 1992 THROUGH FY 1996, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges-a.html. 
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In June of 2006, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White and interpreted the statute broadly, 
holding that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII forbids any employer 
action that would dissuade a reasonable employee from making a 
discrimination claim, including actions unrelated to employment or the 
workplace.9  In Burlington, railroad employee Sheila White claimed that she 
was transferred from forklift operation to hard track labor and later suspended 
without pay in retaliation for filing a sexual discrimination claim against her 
supervisor.10  “[T]he date that they took me off that forklift and put me in the 
yard to work with the mens [sic], I didn’t know the first thing about it.  And 
everything out there is hot and heavy.  You could easily get killed or hurt out 
there[,]” White said.11  And referring to her suspension, “[t]hat thirty-seven 
days were the worst days I want to think of.  Two children in school, and I was 
the supporter, and no income coming in.”12  These details are important; 
consideration of White’s particular circumstances is necessary to determine 
whether her employer’s retaliatory conduct is actionable, according to the 
Supreme Court.13  Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen Breyer stated that 
the significance of the employer’s action depends on “the perspective of a 
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.”14 
In a separate concurrence, Justice Samuel Alito agreed with the majority in 
the outcome of the case, that Burlington’s actions were unlawful retaliation, 
but disagreed with the majority’s analysis and test for retaliation.15  Justice 
Alito would limit the scope of unlawful retaliation to adverse employment-
related actions,16 an interpretation more clearly supported by the statutory 
language than the majority’s standard.  Justice Alito argued that the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII should be interpreted consistently with the 
anti-discrimination provision, which is limited to preventing discrimination 
with respect to employment.17  Furthermore, Justice Alito believed that the 
majority’s standard of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position will be 
difficult for courts to apply because it requires consideration of employees’ 
individual characteristics, but does not specify which characteristics courts 
 
 9. Burlington, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006). 
 10. Id. at 2409–10. 
 11. Shaila Dewan, Forklift Driver’s Stand Leads to Broad Rule Protecting Workers Who 
Fear Retaliation, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2006, at A1. 
 12. Morning Edition: Supreme Court Sides with Worker in Retaliation Suit (NPR radio 
broadcast June 23, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story 
Id=5505828. 
 13. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415. 
 14. Id. at 2416. 
 15. Id. at 2422 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 2419–21. 
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must consider.18  Justice Alito would instead apply the standard used by the 
Sixth Circuit below, which found that White’s reassignment and suspension 
were materially adverse employment actions and thus prohibited under Title 
VII.19 
This Note argues that the majority’s test for retaliation will in fact prove 
unworkable, as Justice Alito suggested, and that the Sixth Circuit’s standard is 
a more equitable and reasonable interpretation of Title VII and the anti-
retaliation provision.  Part II provides an overview of Title VII and its main 
provisions, with discussion of the elements necessary to establish 
discrimination and retaliation claims.  That section also describes the circuit 
split and the competing retaliation standards.  Part III describes Burlington 
Northern v. White in detail, discussing the facts of the case, the two Sixth 
Circuit decisions, the Supreme Court’s ultimate holdings in the case, and 
Justice Alito’s concurrence.  Part IV provides an analysis of the majority’s 
standard for retaliation and suggests that Justice Alito’s interpretation of 
retaliation under Title VII is more consistent with the language and purpose of 
the statute.  That section also discusses the difficulties courts are likely to have 
in applying the majority’s standard and the practical problems the new 
standard will cause employers and, eventually, employees.  Part V concludes 
that the standard for retaliation under Title VII should be the same objective 
standard used in discrimination cases, that this standard strikes the appropriate 
balance between the rights of employers and employees, and that this standard 
will be effective in securing individual civil rights under Title VII. 
I.  TITLE VII AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. Overview of Title VII 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted primarily to eliminate 
discrimination in public accommodations, public education, and employment, 
at a time when racial discrimination was the “[m]ost glaring.”20  Congress did 
not intend for the Act to breed litigation, but instead sought to encourage 
voluntary resolution of all but the most serious types of discrimination.21  
Accordingly, Title VII’s primary purpose “is not to provide redress but to 
avoid harm”22 through a system of formal and informal remedial procedures 
implemented by the EEOC.23  For example, the EEOC encourages employers 
 
 18. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2421. 
 19. Id. at 2422. 
 20. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393–94; Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 241–68 (1964). 
 21. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914. 
 22. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998). 
 23. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2401. 
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to establish an internal complaint procedure for discrimination complaints 
which, if effective, can limit employer liability.24  The Supreme Court has 
affirmed this preventative approach as consistent with Title VII’s purpose, 
stating that employers deserve credit for making “reasonable efforts to 
discharge their duty” to prevent and remedy discriminatory conduct.25 
Victims of discrimination must first file a complaint with the EEOC, which 
investigates claims and has the power to enjoin the employer from unlawful 
practices.26  If the EEOC does not take action on a complaint within a certain 
period of time, the complaining party can bring a civil action against the 
employer.27 
Title VII defines unlawful employment discrimination in two sections.  
Section 703(a) of the Act makes it unlawful for an employer 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment 
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.28 
The Supreme Court in Burlington referred to this section as Title VII’s 
“substantive anti-discrimination provision.”29  This provision prohibits 
“disparate treatment” of a protected class and also conduct that may be facially 
neutral but has a “disparate impact” on protected individuals equivalent to 
intentional discrimination.30  To recover under a disparate treatment theory, the 
plaintiff must establish a discriminatory motive underlying the employer’s 
action; disparate impact claims, however, do not require proof of a 
discriminatory motive.31 
For a plaintiff to recover for disparate treatment, the challenged employer 
conduct must be either a tangible employment action resulting in a significant 
change in employment status or benefits,32 or must be harassment so severe 
 
 24. See, e.g., EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, No. N-915-050 (Mar. 19, 
1990), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentissues.html. 
 25. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806. 
 26. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. § 2000e-2(a). 
 29. Burlington, ____ U.S. ____ , 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2411 (2006). 
 30. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986–87 (1988). 
 31. Id. at 986. 
 32. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth (Ellerth), 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] PROVING RETALIATION AFTER BURLINGTON v. WHITE 1225 
that it effectively alters the conditions of plaintiff’s employment and creates an 
abusive or “hostile working environment.”33 
Section 704(a) of Title VII, the “anti-retaliation provision,”34 makes it 
unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any of his employees . . . 
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice 
by this subchapter, or because he has . . . participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”35  To establish a 
prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show participation in an 
activity protected by Title VII, employer conduct adversely affecting the 
plaintiff, and a causal link between the protected activity and the employer 
conduct.36  Plaintiffs do not need to prove the underlying discrimination claim 
to successfully claim retaliation; they need only a reasonable belief that 
discrimination occurred.37  In addition, section 704(a) protects all individuals 
who oppose discriminatory practices, whether they participate in formal or in 
informal proceedings,38 and whether or not they are a member of a protected 
class.39 
Under both sections 703(a) and 704(a), if the plaintiff has no direct 
evidence of discrimination, she may present circumstantial evidence according 
to the burden shifting rules applied by the Supreme Court in McDonnell 
Douglas v. Green,40 a disparate treatment case.41  The plaintiff has the initial 
burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation; the 
burden then shifts to the employer to show a legitimate justification for the 
challenged conduct; the burden then returns to the plaintiff to show that the 
 
 33. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
 34. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2411. 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). 
 36. See, e.g., White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R. Co. (White II), 364 F.3d 789, 796 (6th 
Cir. 2004). 
 37. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 187–88 (2005); Crumpacker v. Kan. 
Dept. of Human Res., 338 F.3d 1163, 1171 & n.5 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n actual violation is not 
required to maintain a retaliation claim under Title VII.”) (emphasis in original). 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1514 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(making an informal complaint to supervisor is a protected activity); see also Deborah L. Brake, 
Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 77–78 (2005) (noting that without protection from retaliation at 
less formal stages, complainants could be discouraged from reporting altogether or forced into 
taking formal legal action). 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(making a complaint about treatment of others is a protected activity even when the employee is 
not a member of the protected class). 
 40. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 41. See, e.g., Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 2003) (applying 
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting rules to retaliation cases); see also Kari Jahnke, Protecting 
Employees from Employees: Applying Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision to Coworker 
Harassment, 19 LAW & INEQ. 101, 103–05 (2001) (discussing the burden shifting in retaliation 
cases). 
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employer’s justification is a pretext to conceal a discriminatory or retaliatory 
motive.42 
Both section 703(a) and section 704(a) make it unlawful for employers to 
“discriminate against” individuals, whether on the basis of their status or their 
participation in a protected activity.43  The term “discriminate against” is used 
throughout Title VII but not defined in the statute,44 although courts agree 
generally that it refers to some distinction or difference that harms protected 
individuals.45  Section 703(a), however, explicitly prohibits discrimination with 
respect to the “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment,”46 while section 704(a) does not specify what type of 
discrimination or conduct constitutes unlawful retaliation.47  In addition, the 
Supreme Court has further clarified the meaning of discrimination under 
section 703(a) with concepts such as disparate treatment, hostile work 
environment, and tangible employment action.48  However, until Burlington, 
the Court did not establish comparable precedent in the law of retaliation, nor 
indicate whether substantive discrimination concepts also applied under 
section 704(a).49  Because of the lack of Supreme Court precedent and the 
ambiguous language of the statute, the federal courts of appeals developed 
conflicting interpretations of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. 
B. The Circuit Split 
Even before Burlington, the circuits agreed on the elements necessary to 
establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, as stated above: 
plaintiff’s participation in a protected activity, employer conduct adverse to the 
plaintiff, and a causal link between the protected activity and the employer 
 
 42. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–805. 
 43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 3(a). 
 44. See id. § 2000e. 
 45. See Burlington, ____ U.S. ____ , 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2410 (2006) (citing, inter alia, Jackson 
v. Birmingham Bd. Of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005), and 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 758 
(2d ed. 1989)). 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 47. See id. § 2000e-3(a). 
 48. See supra notes 25, 30, 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 49. Cathy Currie, Staying on the Straighter and Narrower: A Criticism of the Court’s 
Definition of Adverse Employment Action Under the Retaliation Provision of Title VII, 43 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 1323, 1325–28 (2002) (discussing the application of § 703(a) concepts to § 704(a) 
claims); Linda M. Glover, Title VII Section 704(a) Retaliation Claims: Turning a Blind Eye 
Towards Justice, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 577, 610 (2001) (discussing the lack of Supreme Court 
precedent on retaliation). 
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conduct.50  The circuits disagreed, however, over what types of retaliatory 
conduct were actionable, and three basic standards developed. 
The First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits applied the 
broadest standard and interpreted Title VII to prohibit any adverse treatment 
based on a retaliatory motive that was reasonably likely to deter an employee 
from engaging in protected activity.51  This standard encompasses any negative 
evaluation or reference, any change in duties, schedule, pay, or benefits,52 and 
any transfer to a “more unfriendly working environment.”53  In addition, 
hostility from coworkers in response to an employee’s discrimination charge 
can constitute unlawful retaliation.54  Under this approach, an employer is 
liable for a retaliatory personnel action even if it is ultimately inconsequential; 
the severity of the act “goes to the issue of damages, not liability.”55  This 
standard is consistent with EEOC guidelines, which state that an adverse action 
does not need to be an “ultimate employment action,” such as a discharge, or 
even be related to employment to qualify as unlawful retaliation.56  The 
Supreme Court ultimately adopted a version of this standard in Burlington.57 
The Fifth and the Eighth Circuits applied the most restrictive standard and 
limited actionable retaliation to “ultimate employment decisions” involving 
hiring, firing, demoting, or a loss in wages or benefits.58  Under this standard, 
an employee suffering a retaliatory “intermediate employment action,” such as 
a suspension or a negative evaluation, cannot recover unless the action resulted 
in a final employment decision, such as the denial of a promotion.59  These 
circuits interpreted Title VII’s substantive anti-discrimination provision more 
 
 50. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 570 (6th Cir. 2004); Roberson v. Alltel 
Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir. 2004); Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 156 (2d 
Cir. 2004); Rhodes v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 51. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240–43 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating the standard and 
describing the circuit split); see also Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2006); 
Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 89–90 (1st Cir. 2005); Jeffries v. Kansas, 147 F.3d 1220, 
1232–33 (10th Cir. 1998); Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 
1998); Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 52. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243; Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334. 
 53. Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334. 
 54. E.g., Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 55. Id. 
 56. EEOC, 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, SECTION 8: RETALIATION 8–13 (1998), 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.html [hereinafter EEOC COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL]. 
 57. Burlington, ___ U.S.___, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006). 
 58. E.g., Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997); Mattern v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 59. See Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 395 F.3d 872, 880–81 (8th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff’s failure 
to appeal negative evaluation served as a withdrawal from the tenure-review process and 
therefore denial of tenure was not an ultimate employment decision). 
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broadly than the anti-retaliation provision; because section 704(a) refers only 
to “discrimination” and does not mention the specific harms listed in section 
703(a), it “can only be read to exclude such vague harms, and to include only 
ultimate employment decisions.”60  For a hostile work environment to qualify 
as an ultimate employment decision, the plaintiff must claim that conditions 
were so abusive that he was constructively discharged.61  The Sixth Circuit 
applied a version of the “ultimate employment decision” standard in its first 
decision in White v. Burlington Northern.62 
The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits took the most moderate approach 
and applied the same standard to retaliation claims as to substantive 
discrimination claims.63  These circuits interpreted section 704(a) consistently 
with 703(a) and required discrimination plaintiffs under both sections to show 
an adverse action related to the “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment.”64  This standard is not limited to ultimate employment 
decisions, but covers any type of adverse action affecting employment.65  The 
“adverse employment action” element incorporates the section 703(a) 
“tangible employment action” precedent;66 retaliatory conduct and 
discriminatory conduct must meet the same test for materiality.67  This 
standard likewise incorporates hostile work environment precedent,68 and thus 
“unchecked retaliatory co-worker harassment, if sufficiently severe, may 
constitute adverse employment action.”69  Sitting en banc, the Sixth Circuit 
applied this standard in White v. Burlington Northern.70 
Each of these three standards was applied to Sheila White’s claims against 
Burlington: The Sixth Circuit initially applied the “ultimate employment 
decision” test, and then, sitting en banc, applied the “adverse employment 
action” test; the Supreme Court resolved the case by finding that Burlington’s 
actions were likely to deter an employee from making a discrimination 
charge.71  The following discussion of the two Sixth Circuit decisions and the 
Supreme Court’s resolution in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. 
 
 60. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 709. 
 61. See id. (“Hostility from fellow employees, having tools stolen, and resulting anxiety, 
without more, do not constitute ultimate employment decisions.”). 
 62. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White I), 310 F.3d 443, 446 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 63. See, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001); Richardson v. 
N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999); Robinson v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300–01 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 64. Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300–01. 
 65. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865. 
 66. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 67. Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300–01. 
 68. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 69. Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 70. White I, 364 F.3d 789, 795–96 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 71. See generally infra Part II. 
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White outlines the reasoning of each standard and exhibits each in practice as it 
applied to the facts of Burlington. 
II.  BURLINGTON NORTHERN & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY V. WHITE 
A. Facts 
In June of 1997, Sheila White began working at Burlington Railroad as a 
forklift operator and as the only woman in the Maintenance of Way 
Department at Burlington’s Tennessee Yard.72  In September, 1997, White 
reported to Burlington officials that her supervisor, Bill Joiner, repeatedly 
expressed his belief that women should not work in the Maintenance of Way 
Department and insulted White in front of her coworkers.73  After an 
investigation, Burlington suspended Joiner and required him to attend sexual 
harassment training.74  After Joiner was suspended, Burlington’s roadmaster, 
Marvin Brown, removed White from forklift duty and reassigned her to more 
arduous work as a track laborer.75  Brown told her the transfer was in response 
to complaints that an employee with more seniority than White was entitled to 
the forklift position.76 
White then filed a complaint with the EEOC, claiming that the 
reassignment was gender-based discrimination and retaliation for her 
complaint about Joiner.77  A few months later, White filed a second complaint 
with the EEOC, claiming that Brown had placed her under surveillance in 
retaliation for her charges.78  A few days after Brown received notice of this 
second complaint, White’s supervisor reported that she had been insubordinate, 
and Brown immediately suspended White without pay.79  White then filed a 
grievance with Burlington appealing her suspension and also a third retaliation 
complaint with the EEOC.80 
While the grievance was pending over the Christmas holiday season, 
White had no job, no income, and no guarantee that she would ever be able to 
return to work.81  She received treatment for emotional distress during this time 
period and incurred medical expenses.82  After an investigation, Burlington 
concluded that White had not been insubordinate and should not have been 
 
 72. Burlington, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2409. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. White II, 364 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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suspended.83  On January 16, 1998, White was reinstated to her position and 
awarded full backpay for her thirty-seven day suspension.84  Having exhausted 
administrative remedies with the EEOC, White filed a complaint against 
Burlington in United States District Court, alleging gender-based 
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII.85 
In 2000, the case went to trial, and the jury found that Burlington was not 
liable on the discrimination claim but was liable for unlawful retaliation.86  The 
jury awarded White $43,500 in compensatory damages, including her medical 
expenses, but no punitive damages.87  After the verdict, Burlington 
unsuccessfully moved for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, for 
a new trial.88  After its motion was denied, Burlington appealed to the Sixth 
Circuit.89 
B. The First Sixth Circuit Decision 
On appeal, Burlington claimed that White had failed to state a claim for 
retaliation because neither her job reassignment nor her temporary suspension 
was an adverse employment action under Title VII.90  Burlington asserted that 
removal from forklift duty did not disadvantage White; she was hired as a 
general track maintenance worker and maintained that position while operating 
the forklift and while performing the more physically demanding duties.91  
Burlington then argued that because White’s suspension was temporary, it was 
not a “final employment decision” and so not an actionable adverse 
employment action.92  Furthermore, Burlington noted that the suspension did 
not result in any permanent economic harm because White was reinstated to 
her position with full backpay and benefits.93 
The Sixth Circuit agreed with Burlington, finding that neither White’s 
reassignment nor her suspension was an adverse employment action sufficient 
to support a retaliation claim under Title VII.94  In reaching its conclusion, the 
court relied on Sixth Circuit cases that required retaliation plaintiffs to show “a 
materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of . . . employment”95  
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. White II, 364 F.3d at 794. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. White I, 310 F.3d 443, 446 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 449. 
 91. Id. at 451. 
 92. Id. at 452. 
 93. White I, 310 F.3d at 452. 
 94. Id. at 455. 
 95. Id. at 450. 
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The court defined a “material adverse change” basically as an ultimate 
employment decision, such as a termination of employment, a demotion, a loss 
of wages or benefits, or other such “disruptive” changes in employment 
conditions.96  Unlike these types of employment decisions, lateral 
reassignments like White’s, without changes in pay or work hours, were 
generally not actionable.97 
In support of this argument, the court cited Darnell v. Campbell County 
Fiscal Court in which an employee was transferred to a job with the same 
rank, duties, and pay, but required to commute an additional twenty minutes 
each way; this transfer was not an employment decision sufficient to constitute 
actionable retaliation.98  The court also cited similar cases from the Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits which held that a transfer to a job with poor working 
conditions,99 a transfer to a job perceived as less desirable by the employee,100 
and a transfer to a more stressful job101 were all insufficient to satisfy the 
adverse employment action element of a retaliation claim.102  The court also 
cited Murphy v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.,103 which held there was no 
adverse employment action where a female employee received less than her 
expected pay raise, was placed on night and weekend shifts, and complained 
that her supervisor placed his notes of their conversations in her personnel 
file.104  Relying on this precedent, the court concluded that reassigning White 
from forklift operation to more physically demanding work was not a 
“materially adverse change” in the conditions of employment.105 
Likewise, the court also found that White’s suspension was not an adverse 
employment action.106  In holding that White’s suspension was not actionable, 
the court relied primarily on Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt University,107 
which concerned a professor’s claim that she was denied tenure at Vanderbilt 
for discriminatory reasons.108  After Vanderbilt conducted an internal 
investigation, the plaintiff was granted tenure and also received full backpay as 
of the date she should have been granted tenure.109  Despite this relief, the 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. White I, 310 F.3d at 450 (citing Darnell v. Campbell Cty. Fiscal Court, 924 F.2d 1057 
(6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision)). 
 99. Bradford v. Norfolk S. Corp., 54 F.3d 1412, 1420 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 100. Kelleher v. Flawn, 761 F.2d 1079, 1086 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 101. Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 102. White I, 310 F.3d at 450. 
 103. 832 F. Supp. 1543 (N.D. Ga. 1993). 
 104. White I, 310 F.3d at 450 (citing Murphy, 832 F. Supp. at 1550–51). 
 105. Id. at 451. 
 106. Id. at 453. 
 107. 185 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 108. White I, 310 F.3d at 452 (citing Dobbs-Weinstein, 185 F.3d at 544). 
 109. Dobbs-Weinstein, 185 F.3d at 544. 
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plaintiff sued Vanderbilt under Title VII for emotional distress, damage to her 
reputation, and interest on the backpay.110  The Sixth Circuit held that the 
initial wrongful denial of tenure was not a final adverse employment decision 
because the plaintiff ultimately received tenure with backpay.111  The court 
stated: 
She has not here suffered a final or lasting adverse employment action 
sufficient to create a prima facie case of employment discrimination under 
Title VII.  To rule otherwise would be to encourage litigation before the 
employer has an opportunity to correct through internal grievance procedures 
any wrong it may have committed.112 
The court held that, like the professor in Dobbs-Weinstein, White suffered 
no materially adverse employment action with respect to her suspension 
because she was ultimately reinstated with backpay.113  The court rejected 
White’s claim that she endured unique hardships because her suspension 
occurred during the holiday season, stating that “[w]hile emotional injuries 
may be affected by the season, it does not make the suspension a sufficiently 
adverse employment action.”114  The court thus concluded that because neither 
White’s lateral job transfer nor her temporary suspension were adverse 
employment actions within the meaning of Title VII, White had failed to make 
a prima facie case for retaliation.115  The court reversed the trial court’s 
decision and set aside the jury verdict in favor of White.116  White then 
successfully petitioned the Sixth Circuit for a rehearing.117 
C. The Sixth Circuit En Banc Decision 
On rehearing, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, readdressed the scope of 
the anti-retaliation provision and found that both White’s reassignment to more 
difficult work and her suspension were adverse employment actions in 
violation of Title VII.118  The court refused, however, to revise its definition of 
adverse employment action and adopt the standard of the EEOC, which filed 
an amicus curiae brief on White’s behalf.119  The EEOC Guidelines interpret 
Title VII as prohibiting “any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory 
motive and is reasonably likely to deter a charging party or others from 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 545. 
 112. White I, 310 F.3d at 453 (quoting Dobbs-Weinstein, 185 F.3d at 546). 
 113. Id. at 454–55. 
 114. Id. at 453. 
 115. Id. at 455. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See White II, 364 F.3d 789, 791 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 118. Id. at 801–03. 
 119. Id. at 798, 800. 
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engaging in a protected activity.”120  The EEOC argued that this broad 
definition is supported by the language of Title VII; unlike the anti-
discrimination provision, the anti-retaliation provision contains no language 
restricting its coverage to significant employment decisions.121  The court 
disagreed, finding that such a literal reading of Title VII would authorize 
claims based on “petty slights and trivial annoyances.”122  The court held that 
not all employment discrimination is actionable; plaintiffs must show an 
“adverse” or “tangible” employment action beyond “trivial workplace 
dissatisfactions.”123  The court then discussed precedent in which it developed 
the adverse employment action element to prevent such trivial claims.124 
The court cited Geisler v. Folsom125 as the first Sixth Circuit case holding 
that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision required proof of an “adverse 
employment action.”126  In Geisler, the plaintiff claimed that the increased 
workplace tension that arose after she filed a sex discrimination charge 
amounted to unlawful retaliation.127  Although the court found that Geisler’s 
claim was too general, it held that such increases in tension could be evidence 
of adverse employment action and that “any discrete act or course of conduct 
which could be construed as retaliation must be examined carefully.”128 
The court then cited Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc.129 as the 
primary case that developed the Sixth Circuit’s definition of an adverse 
employment action.130  In Kocsis, the plaintiff claimed she was transferred 
from her position as nursing supervisor to a “unit nurse” position for 
discriminatory reasons.131  Although her salary and benefits were unaffected, 
the plaintiff claimed she suffered an adverse employment action because her 
patient-care duties as a unit nurse were much more physically demanding than 
her supervisor duties.132  The court disagreed, holding that a change in job 
duties without a change in salary or work hours does not usually qualify as a 
materially adverse employment action.133  The court also held, however, that 
such a lateral job transfer may be actionable if it corresponds to “a less 
 
 120. Id. at 798 (quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 56, at 8–13). 
 121. Id. 
 122. White II, 364 F.3d 789, 799 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (internal quotation omitted). 
 123. Id. at 795. 
 124. Id. 
 125. 735 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 126. White II, 364 F.3d at 796. 
 127. Geisler, 735 F.2d at 993. 
 128. Id. at 996. 
 129. 97 F.3d 876 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 130. White II, 364 F.3d at 797. 
 131. Kocsis, 97 F.3d at 879, 880. 
 132. Id. at 880. 
 133. Id. at 885 (citing Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 638 (6th Cir. 1987)). 
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distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material 
responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular 
situation.”134  The Supreme Court cited Kocsis in its landmark discrimination 
case, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,135 when it held that an adverse 
employment action involves a significant change in employment conditions, 
such as a demotion or a substantial change in duties.136 
Sitting en banc, the Sixth Circuit in White affirmed the definition of 
adverse employment action developed in Kocsis and Ellerth and held that 
plaintiffs must show such an action under Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision.137  In doing so, the court incorporated the concept of “tangible 
employment action” developed under the anti-discrimination provision and 
interpreted both sections to require a material change in the conditions of 
employment.138  The court thus rejected the EEOC’s argument that any type of 
retaliatory conduct is actionable, stating that requiring plaintiffs to show a 
tangible employment action accomplishes the statute’s purpose while 
preventing trivial lawsuits.139  The court also rejected the Dobbs-Weinstein 
requirement of an ultimate employment decision.140  The court believed instead 
that the phrase “discriminate against” should be given the same meaning each 
time it appears in the statute, and thus that the adverse employment action 
requirement applied equally to all Title VII discrimination and retaliation 
claims.141 
The court then applied its standard to the facts of White, first finding that 
White’s thirty-seven day suspension without pay was an adverse employment 
action, not a trivial employment action causing a “mere inconvenience” or 
“bruised ego.”142  The court also held that reinstatement with backpay did not 
make White whole; she was entitled to interest, attorneys’ fees, and damages 
for emotional suffering.143  The court then found that White’s reassignment to 
hard track labor was a demotion evidenced by the circumstances: the forklift 
position required more qualifications, the track labor was much more arduous, 
and Burlington employees considered forklift operation a more desirable 
position.144  The court held that such a demotion was a material change in 
 
 134. Id. at 886. 
 135. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 136. Id. at 762. 
 137. White II, 364 F.3d 789, 800 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 138. See id. at 798–800. 
 139. Id. at 799. 
 140. Id. at 801 & n. 7. 
 141. Id. at 799. 
 142. White II, 364 F.3d at 802 (citing Kocsis, 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 803. 
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employment conditions and unlawful retaliatory conduct.145  The court thus 
concluded that a jury could reasonably have found that both White’s 
suspension and reassignment were adverse employment actions in violation of 
Title VII,146 and it affirmed the district court’s denial of Burlington’s motion 
for judgment as a matter of law.147  Burlington then petitioned the Supreme 
Court for certiorari, asking the Court to resolve the circuit split and determine 
which interpretation of Title VII governs retaliation claims.148 
D.  The Supreme Court’s Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide two issues: whether Title 
VII requires a link between retaliatory conduct and employment and how 
harmful the conduct must be to constitute actionable retaliation.149  After 
examining the competing interpretations in the circuits, Justice Breyer, writing 
for the majority, concluded that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is not 
limited to workplace conduct and that it prohibits all conduct serious enough to 
dissuade a reasonable worker from making a discrimination charge.150 
The Court first rejected the standard, applied by the Sixth Circuit below, 
requiring retaliation plaintiffs to show a materially adverse employment 
action.151  The Court refused to read section 704(a), Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision, in conjunction with section 703(a), the anti-discrimination 
provision, and thus limited conduct affecting the terms, conditions, or status of 
employment.152  The Court stated that Congress intended to omit that language 
from section 704 because the provisions serve different purposes: section 703 
prevents discrimination based on an individual’s status, while section 704 
protects certain conduct.153  The Court found that section 704’s purpose could 
not be achieved by limiting its protection to the workplace because retaliatory 
conduct can cause harm outside the workplace.154  In support of this argument, 
the Court cited Rochon v. Gonzales, in which the FBI retaliated by refusing to 
investigate death threats against an employee,155 and Berry v. Stevinson 
 
 145. Id. at 804 (noting that the court had rejected Burlington Northern’s argument that no 
adverse employment action was taken). 
 146. Id. at 804. 
 147. White II, 364 F.3d at 804, 808. 
 148. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Burlington, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (No. 05-259), 2005 
WL 2055901. 
 149. Burlington, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2411 (2006). 
 150. Id. at 2410–11, 2414–15. 
 151. Id. at 2410, 2411. 
 152. Id. at 2411. 
 153. Id. at 2412. 
 154. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2412. 
 155. Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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Chevrolet,156 in which an employer retaliated by filing false criminal charges 
against an employee.157 
The Court rejected Burlington’s argument that it is “anomalous” to extend 
more protection to the victims of retaliation than to victims of discrimination, 
pointing again to the different purposes of section 703(a) and section 704(a).158  
Without examining the objectives of the anti-discrimination provision, the 
Court stated that section 704 protection must extend beyond employment-
related retaliation so that employees will be willing to report unlawful 
practices.159  Thus, the Court rejected the retaliation standards applied by 
circuits requiring an adverse employment action, as well as those requiring 
“ultimate employment decisions.”160 
The Court conceded, however, that not all retaliation is actionable under 
Title VII and that the judicial standard must filter out trivial complaints.161  In 
concurrence with the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits, the Court held 
that plaintiffs must show a “materially adverse” action, defined as conduct that 
“well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 
charge of discrimination.”162  This standard will be sufficient to prevent Title 
VII from becoming a “general civility code for the American workplace”163 
because “normally petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good 
manners will not create such deterrence.”164 
The Court emphasized the importance of the objective, “reasonable 
employee” standard for retaliation that avoids judicial inquiry into “a 
plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings.”165  The Court explained, however, that 
the standard actually refers to a reasonable employee in the plaintiff’s position; 
in fact, whether retaliatory conduct is actionable depends on the unique 
“circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by 
a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.”166  The 
Court gave several examples of this variable “reasonable employee” standard: 
A schedule change may have a trivial impact on many workers, but will 
constitute retaliation against a “young mother with school age children”; a 
supervisor’s refusal to invite an employee to lunch is usually a “petty slight,” 
but exclusion from a weekly training lunch is actionable retaliation; the 
 
 156. 74 F.3d 980, 984, 986 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 157. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2412. 
 158. Id. at 2414. 
 159. Id. 
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 161. Id. at 2415. 
 162. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (internal citations omitted). 
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average employee who is denied flexible hours after making a discrimination 
charge may not have a remedy, but an employee who needed the flexible 
schedule to care for a disabled child can file a retaliation claim.167 
Applying this standard to White’s retaliation claim, the Court found that 
both of Burlington’s challenged actions were “materially adverse” to White 
and therefore prohibited under Title VII.168  The Court first found that the 
reassignment to the less desirable track laborer position was “one good way to 
discourage an employee such as White from bringing discrimination charges,” 
pointing to the same facts the Sixth Circuit considered in finding that the 
transfer was a demotion.169  In finding that White’s suspension was also a 
materially adverse action, the Court, like the Sixth Circuit, recognized the 
significance of living thirty-seven days without income and the failure of 
backpay to make White whole.170  The Supreme Court, however, also found it 
relevant that White supported a family and that the suspension took place over 
the holidays; the Court quoted her testimony: “That was the worst Christmas I 
had out of my life.”171  Although it applied a much broader standard, the 
Supreme Court, like the Sixth Circuit, found sufficient evidence of retaliation 
and concluded that the jury verdict in favor of White should be upheld.172 
E. Justice Alito’s Concurrence 
Justice Alito wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.173  
While he agreed with the majority that both White’s reassignment and her 
suspension were unlawful retaliation, Justice Alito disagreed with the 
majority’s interpretation of Title VII.174  He believed the majority’s 
interpretation was inconsistent with the statutory language and feared that its 
application will cause practical problems.175 
1. The Textual Argument 
Justice Alito began by quoting sections 703(a) and 704(a),176 emphasizing 
the language in section 703(a)(1) which makes it unlawful for employers to 
discharge, fail to hire, or “otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
 
 167. See Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415–16. 
 168. Id. at 2416. 
 169. Id. at 2416–17; supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2417; supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. 
 171. See Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2417. 
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employment” because of an individual’s race, gender, or religion.177  
Describing section 704(a) as a “complementary and closely related provision,” 
he pointed to that section’s language forbidding an employer “to discriminate 
against any of his employees” for participating in an activity protected by Title 
VII.178  He identified two possible interpretations of the term “discriminate 
against.” 
Under one interpretation, if section 704(a) is read by itself, “discriminate 
against” takes its literal meaning, “to treat differently.”179  This interpretation 
provides more protection for victims of retaliation than for victims of 
discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or natural origin, those persons 
Title VII was primarily enacted to protect.180  Moreover, this interpretation 
“makes a federal case” out of any distinction in the treatment of an employee 
who has participated in a protected activity.181  A plaintiff could establish a 
prima facie case of retaliation by showing he was treated in a “less friendly 
manner” or subjected to more supervision after filing a discrimination 
charge.182  The majority in Burlington rejected this interpretation of section 
704(a) and found that the anti-retaliation provision does not protect against all 
types of retaliation, stating that “[a]n employee’s decision to report 
discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty 
slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all 
employees experience.”183 
The other possible interpretation of “discriminate against” reads sections 
703(a) and 704(a) together so that discrimination in both sections means 
discrimination “with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment.”184  Justice Alito believed that this is the most 
reasonable reading of the statute, although he conceded it is less 
straightforward.185  The majority, however, also rejected this interpretation, 
finding that it denies a remedy to employees who suffered retaliation outside 
the workplace.186  Justice Alito argued that “the majority’s concern is 
misplaced”187 for several reasons.  First, an employee is much more likely to 
suffer retaliation on the job where the employer has the most opportunity to 
 
 177. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2418 n.1 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1)) (emphasis in original). 
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retaliate.188  Furthermore, many retaliatory acts outside the workplace are 
already prohibited under criminal or tort law,189 as in the Berry v. Stevinson 
Chevrolet case cited by the majority in which an employer filed false criminal 
charges against an employee.190  In any case, the materially adverse action test 
is not limited to retaliation that takes place at the workplace, but extends to 
action affecting any term, condition, or privilege of employment.191  For 
example, Justice Alito pointed to the Rochon v. Gonzales case also cited by the 
majority, in which an FBI agent claimed that the Bureau retaliated against him 
by denying him off-duty security that would otherwise be provided. 192  In that 
case, off-duty security qualifies as a privilege of employment under Justice 
Alito’s interpretation, and the agent would have a remedy under Title VII.193 
However, as stated above, the majority rejected both of these 
interpretations and instead found that section 704(a) did not provide a remedy 
for all retaliatory differences in treatment, but only those that “well might have 
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.”194  In refusing to adopt either a strict literal reading of section 
704(a) which would apply to all differences in treatment or a reading which 
incorporates the limits of section 703(a), the majority rejected both 
interpretations of the statutory language that Justice Alito deemed 
reasonable.195   
2. The Practical Application Argument 
Justice Alito also argued that the “perverse” practical consequences of the 
majority’s test are inconsistent with the purpose of Title VII and thus that the 
majority’s interpretation is not what Congress intended.196  Justice Alito broke 
down the majority’s standard, turning first to the phrase “a charge of 
discrimination” and finding that it must refer to the particular charge which 
caused the employer to retaliate against the plaintiff, and not to some generic 
or average claim.197  Justice Alito maintained that requiring the jury to consider 
a generic charge would be unworkable; the jury must consider the severity of 
the underlying discrimination in order to weigh the costs and benefits of filing 
a charge, as required by the majority’s standard.198  Thus, the nature of the 
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 193. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2420 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 194. Id. (quoting majority opinion at 2415). 
 195. Id. at 2418–19. 
 196. Id. at 2420. 
 197. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 198. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2420 n.2 (Alito, J., concurring). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1240 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:1221 
underlying discrimination charge will determine whether the challenged 
conduct would dissuade a reasonable employee in the plaintiff’s position from 
filing that particular charge.199  Justice Alito believed that this test would have 
“perverse results,” as the “degree of protection afforded to a victim of 
retaliation is inversely proportional to the severity of the original act of 
discrimination . . . .”200  If a reasonable employee suffers the most severe 
discrimination, even very severe acts of retaliation will not deter her from 
filing a discrimination charge.201  In contrast, for an employee who suffers a 
mild form of discrimination, the possibility of milder retaliation will more 
easily dissuade her from complaining.202  To Justice Alito, “[t]hese topsy-turvy 
results make no sense.”203 
Justice Alito turned next to the majority’s “reasonable worker” standard 
and found that it was unclear and subjective.204  At first, the majority described 
the test as objective, but then indicated that certain individual characteristics of 
the retaliation plaintiff must be considered.205  Justice Alito restated the 
majority test as “whether the act well might dissuade a reasonable worker who 
shares at least some individual characteristics with the actual victim.”206  In the 
majority’s examples, Justice Alito found three such characteristics—age, 
gender, and family responsibilities—but the majority did not indicate which 
additional characteristics are significant or how courts should determine 
whether a characteristic is relevant.207 
Finally, Justice Alito took issue with the majority’s “loose and unfamiliar 
causation standard”, which asks whether the challenged action “well might 
have dissuaded a reasonable worker” from engaging in a protected activity.208  
Justice Alito stated that especially in employment discrimination and 
retaliation law, “in which standards of causation are already complex, the 
introduction of this new and unclear standard is unwelcome.”209 
Justice Alito argued that, unlike the majority’s standard, his interpretation 
of section 704(a) provides a clear, objective standard that will protect 
employees who have suffered real retaliation while preventing trivial claims 
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from surviving summary judgment.210  He therefore agreed with the circuits 
that required a materially adverse employment action,211 meaning “a 
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to 
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a 
decision causing a significant change in benefits.”212  Believing this 
interpretation to be consistent with the statutory language and the purpose of 
Title VII, Justice Alito concluded that section 704(a) covers only those 
discriminatory acts prohibited under section 703(a).213  Applying this standard 
to Sheila White’s claims against Burlington, Justice Alito found that both her 
reassignment and her suspension were materially adverse actions and therefore 
unlawful retaliation.214 
III.  THE NEW RETALIATION STANDARD 
The Supreme Court’s expansion of Title VII’s protection against retaliation 
in Burlington came as a surprise to many who did not expect such an 
employee-friendly decision from the conservative Roberts Court.215  Employee 
rights groups approved of the Court’s decision to adopt such a context-
dependent test for retaliation: “Had they given a bright-line rule, it would have 
told employers how far they could go and not be liable for it.”216  On the other 
side, employers and their attorneys worried about increased litigation and a 
confusing standard; as one lawyer put it, “the standard is the reasonable person 
in the particular circumstances of the plaintiff, and that makes it difficult to 
advise my clients.”217  Burlington’s true impact, however, will not be apparent 
until the standard is interpreted in the lower courts and its effects are felt in the 
workplace.  In any case, however, the soundness of the Court’s standard will 
depend on whether it furthers the purposes of Title VII, whether it is judicially 
administrable, and whether it appropriately balances the interests of employees 
and employers.  The following sections evaluate the Court’s standard with 
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 217. Id. at 787 (quoting attorney Allan H. Weitzman, who filed an amicus brief on behalf of 
the National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation). 
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respect to those inquiries, followed by a brief discussion of the importance of 
protection against retaliation. 
A. The Majority’s Retaliation Standard Contravenes the Purpose of Title VII 
To begin, the majority’s interpretation of Title VII does not comport with 
the language of the statute or principles of statutory construction.218  Courts 
agree that the “discriminate against” language in section 704(a) is somewhat 
ambiguous; all the standards recognized some limit on what type of retaliatory 
conduct is actionable.219 As a general rule of construction, ambiguous statutory 
language “must be read in the context of other laws pertaining to the same 
subject matter and should be interpreted in the manner which is most 
reasonable and logical in light of the aims and designs of the total body of law 
of which it is a part.”220  Thus, section 704(a) should be interpreted 
consistently with the other anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII and 
likewise limited to discrimination affecting employment.  This interpretation is 
the most reasonable in light of Title VII’s purpose of preventing harm and 
primarily protecting victims of status-based discrimination.221  Rather than 
harmonizing the two discrimination provisions of Title VII, the majority in 
Burlington held that the two sections had entirely different purposes and 
refused to read them together.222  In this way, as Justice Alito argued, the 
Supreme Court derived a retaliation standard with no grounding in the 
statutory language of Title VII.223 
Furthermore, the standard directly conflicts with the primary purpose of 
Title VII by granting more protection to victims of retaliation than victims of 
discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or national origin.  Title VII 
was enacted in response to “glaring” discrimination against minorities who 
were denied the “rights, privileges, and opportunities which are considered to 
be, and must be, the birthright of all citizens.”224  The right to equal 
employment opportunities is a fundamental right which “must be, the birthright 
of all citizens”; the right to seek a remedy under section 704(a) is not.  In 
addition, the framers of Title VII intended to encourage voluntary, informal 
resolution of discrimination complaints in all but the most serious forms of 
discrimination.225  The Supreme Court’s easily-met standard discourages 
 
 218. See supra notes 176–95 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra Part II.B. 
 220. Cohen v. United States, 384 F.2d 1001, 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
 221. See supra Part II.A. 
 222. See Burlington, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412 (2006). 
 223. See supra notes 176–95 and accompanying text. 
 224. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393. 
 225. Id. 
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informal resolution; plaintiffs have more incentive to file a retaliation claim 
seeking compensatory and punitive damages.226 
It is true that enforcement of Title VII depends on employees reporting 
unlawful practices and “[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial 
mechanisms,”227 so that  protection of discrimination plaintiffs is necessary to 
guarantee civil rights.  The majority’s standard, however, expands protection 
beyond victims of real retaliation and therefore does not provide any additional 
security for fundamental rights.  By focusing only on the subjective deterrent 
quality of an employer’s action, the standard recognizes retaliation claims 
based on conduct that is harmless or even seemingly advantageous, so long as 
the particular plaintiff claims the action was adverse.228  In contrast, the 
moderate standard that limits actionable retaliation to conduct affecting 
employment incorporates the materiality test of the substantive anti-
discrimination provision.229  This test is sufficient to ensure employees 
“unfettered access” to Title VII remedies while preventing insignificant claims. 
In sum, the statutory language does not support the majority’s standard for 
retaliation, and it directly conflicts with the purpose of Title VII by encouraging 
litigation and by providing more protection to discrimination claimants than to 
discrimination victims.  In contrast, Justice Alito’s standard logically interprets 
section 704(a) in light of the aims and designs of Title VII by protecting civil 
rights and those who enforce those rights to the same degree. 
B. The Majority’s Standard Is Not Judicially Administrable 
Although the Court granted certiorari in Burlington to promote uniform 
application of the federal law against retaliation, its standard is too unclear and 
subjective to do so.  Already, the district courts have varied in their application 
of the standard.  In Gilmore v. Potter, the plaintiff claimed her employer 
retaliated against her by telling her she was “worthless,” forbidding her from 
speaking to coworkers, and confining her to a small room by threatening to fire 
her if she came out into the workroom.230  After finding that the majority’s 
“reasonably likely to deter” standard was controlling, the court distinguished 
the plaintiff’s facts from those in Burlington: White had presented considerable 
evidence that her reassignment was “more arduous and dirtier,” less 
prestigious, and objectively considered a demotion.231  However, the court in 
 
 226. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (highlighting the increase in Title VII 
retaliation claims). 
 227. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2407 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 
(1997)). 
 228. See Glover, supra note 49, at 582–83. 
 229. See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text. 
 230. No. 4:04-CV-1264 GTE, 2006 WL 3235088, at *10 (E.D. Ark. 2006). 
 231. Id. at *9–10 (citing Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415–16). 
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Gilmore went on to apply a version of the adverse employment action test, first 
finding that the plaintiff had not suffered any loss of pay or benefits.232  The 
court then concluded that no jury could reasonably find that the employer’s 
actions “constituted an adverse employment action” and granted the 
employer’s summary judgment motion.233 
The court in Reis v. Universal City Development Partners, Ltd., similarly 
declined to consider the perspective of a reasonable employee in the plaintiff’s 
position.234  Although the court found Burlington to be controlling, it applied 
the standard articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Doe v. Dekalb County 
School District,235 because it found “no appreciable difference” in the two 
standards.236  The court chose to apply the Doe test, however, because it 
“subsumed a requirement of materiality within its reasonable person standard 
for adversity.”237 
These two cases illustrate that the majority’s test for retaliation is too 
subjective for lower courts to apply without referring to another, now obsolete, 
standard; as the primary finders of fact, the district courts need a clear 
retaliation standard with an objective test for materiality.  So far, the federal 
appellate courts have applied the majority’s standard consistently with 
Burlington.238  However, as of yet, courts have not attempted to determine 
which individual characteristics of a retaliation plaintiff are relevant; resolution 
of this issue will likely vary throughout the circuits.239  In addition, if the lower 
courts continue to deviate from the majority’s standard out of necessity, the 
inconsistencies will eventually be replicated in the appellate courts.  If the 
Supreme Court wants to ensure uniform application of the law of retaliation, it 
will need to articulate a clear, objective test that district courts can apply 
directly to concrete facts. 
C. Are the Benefits of Broad Protection Against Retaliation Worth the Cost? 
The majority’s broad interpretation of Title VII’s protection against 
retaliation benefits plaintiffs more than employees; this standard makes it 
easier for plaintiffs to prove retaliation, but does not meaningfully increase 
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 237. Id. (citations omitted) 
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protection for employees.240  In fact, the standard increases uncertainty and 
employer liability under Title VII, a cost that may be revisited upon the 
employees.  Already, the average cost of defending against an employment 
discrimination claim is $250,000.241  This cost will have the largest impact on 
small businesses that are less likely to have employment practices insurance.242  
Moreover, the number of claims against small businesses has risen while 
claims against large corporations have dropped, most likely because big 
corporations can utilize counsel and human resource departments to follow the 
“minutiae of employment law.”243  In any case, the majority’s standard for 
retaliation confuses experienced employment lawyers, making it difficult even 
for large corporations to prevent liability under the new test. 
Ultimately, employees will pay for this increased employer liability.  
Employers must now devote more resources to defending lawsuits and 
compensating retaliation plaintiffs; as a result, both employee wages and 
company profits will suffer.244  Businesses will be forced to hire fewer 
employees and may subject applicants to more thorough evaluations or even 
unlawful discrimination to prevent potential claimants from being hired, 
resulting in a less fluid job market.  On the whole, employees may find that the 
unpredictable, context-dependent definition of retaliation results in fewer 
employment options and less desirable employment practices than the more 
moderate standard. 
D. Preventing Retaliation is Essential to Preventing Discrimination 
The enforcement of Title VII and all statutes seeking to eradicate 
discrimination depend on individuals being willing to come forward and report 
discrimination.  If the law against retaliation is not enforced, individuals will 
not come forward, and the law against discrimination will also be un-enforced.  
Retaliatory conduct serves to punish those who enforce their civil rights and to 
threaten others into remaining silent.245  Those most vulnerable to 
discrimination, like women and minorities, are most likely to refrain from 
filing a discrimination claim out of fear of retaliation.246  In recognition of the 
importance of preventing retaliation, the Supreme Court in Burlington refused 
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to limit its scope to conduct affecting employment.247  Those who agree with 
the majority’s standard argue that such a subjective standard for retaliation is 
necessary; the objective, privileged perspective of a judge is irrelevant in 
evaluating the harms caused by retaliation.248 
That argument fails to recognize, however, that the more moderate 
standard adopted by Justice Alito constitutes a total incorporation of all 
substantive discrimination law.249  The requirement of a tangible employment 
action involves a consideration of the totality of the circumstances; for 
example, in White II, the court held that a lateral job transfer was actionable 
retaliation under those specific conditions.250  The court applying the moderate 
standard to determining whether a hostile work environment constitutes 
actionable retaliation would also consider the unique circumstances, including 
characteristics of the plaintiff.251  Furthermore, as Justice Alito pointed out, 
retaliatory conduct serious enough to deter an employee from filing a 
discrimination claim will almost always have some effect on the conditions of 
employment, or is already unlawful.252  Retaliatory conduct is in part a threat 
to other employees to prevent them from reporting discrimination;253 
employers have much less motivation to retaliate against an employee in some 
private setting.  The moderate standard is, thus, effective in preventing 
retaliation and, by incorporating the discrimination precedent, provides courts 
and employers with clear guidelines. 
CONCLUSION 
In Burlington v. White, the Supreme Court articulated a broad, uncertain 
standard for retaliation, expanding the scope of Title VII further than the 
framers of the Civil Rights Act intended and leaving district courts and 
employers without clear guidance.  The Court’s interpretation provides more 
protection to those who file discrimination claims than to those who suffer 
discrimination.  In addition, the standard’s ambiguities are likely to result in 
inconsistent application throughout the circuits.  As Justice Alito asserted in 
his concurrence, the Court should have adopted instead the same standard for 
retaliation as it applies to substantive discrimination claims.  This moderate 
standard is grounded in the language of the statute, strikes a just balance 
 
 247. See Burlington, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2407 (2006). 
 248. See Brake, supra note 38, at 98–99. 
 249. See Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring); supra notes 173–212 and 
accompanying text. 
 250. White II, 364 F.3d 789, 803 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 251. See, e.g., Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 
1999). 
 252. See supra notes 184–95 and accompanying text. 
 253. See Brake, supra note 38, at 19. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] PROVING RETALIATION AFTER BURLINGTON v. WHITE 1247 
between the interests of employers and employees, and still provides unfettered 
access to the remedies of Title VII.  Furthermore, adoption of the moderate 
standard would finally resolve the circuit split: Its consistent application by 
district courts to substantive discrimination law demonstrates that the standard 
is judicially administrable and capable of uniform interpretation.  Most 
importantly, the moderate standard enforces equal rights through protecting all 
victims of discrimination equally, thereby, serving the purpose of the Civil 
Rights Act. 
The Civil Rights Act was enacted to prevent discrimination based on race, 
gender, or religion, not to provide compensation for the victims of 
discrimination.  The standard announced in Bulington v. White contravenes the 
Act’s prospective purpose; it will have the greatest effect in litigation contexts 
by providing retaliation plaintiffs a better chance at recovery while failing to 
provide clear guidance for employers seeking to avoid retaliatory conduct.  
Discriminatory conduct by an employer should be held to violate Title VII if 
the conduct is related to employment, whether the plaintiff is alleging status-
based discrimination or retaliation.  Title VII guarantees the right to equal 
employment opportunities and should provide equal opportunities to victims of 
discrimination to enforce that right, regardless of the basis for that 
discrimination. 
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